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ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION: EXECUTIVE JET IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Constitutional and Legislative Grants of Jurisdiction
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution extends the judicial power of
the United States "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
This section also extends the federal judicial power "to all cases in law and
equity arising under the Constitution" and "to controversies ... between
citizens of different states." Despite the apparent parallel position of these
clauses in the Constitution, the grant of admiralty jurisdiction is signifi-
cantly different. Federal question jurisdiction is generally regarded as lim-
ited to the interpretation and application of the Constitution, federal
legislative enactments and treaties, and it is the conventional wisdom that
within this precise grant of jurisdiction the federal courts do not have the
law making ability characteristic of state courts. Under the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson' the federal courts exercised common law rule making pow-
ers in diversity of citizenship cases, on the assumption that this power was
inherent in the jurisdictional grant. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,2 however,
brought an end to this practice. The applicable law for these controver-
sies is exclusively that of the state. For federal question and diversity
cases, then, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction, but the source
of the controlling law is external to the court.
By contrast, federal courts have long exercised substantive rule making
powers on the basis of the jurisdictional grant derived from the "admiralty
and maritime" clause. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., is a recent
example of the exercise of this power. Moragne, a seaman, was killed
while working aboard a vessel on navigable waters within Florida's terri-
torial jurisdiction. The Florida supreme court, under a state provision for
certified questions, had held the Florida wrongful death statute inappli-
cable to cases in which the fatality was due to the unseaworthiness of a
vessel.' The United States Supreme Court examined existing admiralty
doctrine for a basis of recovery and found it unhelpful. Rather than deny
relief, the Court revised the general maritime law to encompass a remedy
for wrongful death within state territorial waters.
The constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction and the "necessary
and proper" clause 5 together have been construed as constitutionally pre-
141 U.S. 1 (1842).
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
4 Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 Fla. (1968).
-U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
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empting the area of admiralty law. Southern Pacific v. Jensen6 held
that the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction gave Congress "para-
mount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail
throughout the country.... And further, that in the absence of some con-
-trolling statute, the general maritime 'law developed by the federal courts
constitutes part of the national law applicable to matters within admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. ' 7 Moreover, the Court has held that the Consti-
itution "took from the States all power, by legislation or judicial decision,
,to contravene the essential purposes of, or to work material injury to, char-
acteristic features of such law or to interfere with its proper harmony
and uniformity in its international and interstate relations."
While admiralty jurisdiction may be preemptive of the common law,
this is so only to the extent that Congress has conferred jurisdiction. In an
early Supreme Court decision, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Justice Story
argued that the language of article III, section 2 obligated Congress to
vest in the federal courts the whole judicial power contemplated by the
Constitution. In 1845, however, it was explicitly held that the judicial
power of the United States, except in cases of original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court,
is ... dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes
of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole
power of creating tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) for the exer-
cise of judicial power, and of investing them with jurisdiction either lim-
ited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in
the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the
public good.10
The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to this position.1 Thus, in
the context of admiralty jurisdiction thus developed, the state courts could
theoretically administer the common law to settle disputes arising upon the
high seas or other navigable waters, if Congress has not extended the ad-
miralty jurisdiction to include such disputes. The basis of a suit would be
the common law transitory cause of action which may be enforced wherever
personal jurisdiction of the parties can be obtained.
B. Savings to Suitors Clause
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 originally granted to the district
courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
6 244 U.S. 205 (1916).
7Id. at 215.
8 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (102).
9 14 U.S. 304, 330 (1816).
10 Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845).
11 E.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182
(1943); Federal Power Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939).
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maritime jurisdiction ... saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a com-
mon law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it."'1 2 The
"saving clause" is the only exception to the exclusiveness of the grant of
substantive admiralty jurisdiction to the district courts. This exception in
no way restricts jurisdiction of the admiralty courts, but rather allows, to a
limited extent, application of the common law. The saving clause recog-
nizes that some maritime matters had been administered by the common
law courts of the colonies"3 and insures that this capability will continue.' 4
The exercise of admiralty jurisdiction under the saving-to-suitors clause,
by both state courts and federal law courts with diversity jurisdiction, is
unique. The maritime tort would be treated as a common law transitory
cause of action, and the ascertainment of plaintiff's right to recover would
be governed by the common law. But there is an important limitation-
the doctrine of federal supremacy and national uniformity as articulated
in Jensen. 5 Thus when a cause of action arises within a maritime context,
common law rules can not be applied to deny plaintiff's recovery. For
example, contributory negligence, a doctrine not recognized in admiralty,
could not be asserted as a defense,' 6 and a state allocation of the burden
of persuasion, which would directly affect plaintiff's ability to recover,
would be inapplicable if a contrary admiralty rule exists.'" On the other
hand, the rationale of Jensen may serve to limit a plaintiff's recovery. In
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S.Co.,'8 an injured seaman sued at common law
for full indemnity, but the Court held his cause of action to be maritime,
and, unless some other liability had been imposed upon the defendants,
recovery was limited to that.which admiralty would give-wages and main-
tenance and cure.
However, once a right to relief has been determined, the full range of
common law remedies is available. Legislatively created remedies are also
available in cases in which the relief is equivalent to the type that the com-
mon law would provide. Particularly significant is the use of state wrong-
ful death statutes.
Another factor relevant to the relationship between common law and
admiralty is that traditionally the common law courts were limited in ad-
miralty matters to actions in personam, that is, actions against specific per-
12 1 Stat. 76-77 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970)).
13 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 362 (1959), rehearing
denied, 359 U.S. 962 (1959).
14 New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. 343, 390 (1848).
15244 U.S. 205, 215 (1916).
16 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
17 Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). In a state court action for
personal injuries brought by a seaman, a ship owner, who sets up the seaman's release as a de-
fense, has his burden of persuasion determined according to admiralty law.
18247 U.S. 372, 382 (1918). The impact of this specific decision may have been amelio-
rated by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 33 (The Jones Act), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
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sons such as the owner or master of a ship. An in rem proceeding directly
against a vessel was beyond the power of the common law court.19 While
this general rule continues today, the common law is capable of reaching
vessels under certain conditions. In Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey,20
the Court upheld a bill in equity in a state court to foreclose a common
law lien upon a raft for towing services. The suit was considered to be in
personam with an auxiliary attachment and thus within the common law
and the saving to suitors clause.
Admiralty law need not be applied when no benefit to the maritime
industry is promoted by an exclusive federal rule. In such cases, the state
may be allowed to create a remedy even though, it conflicts with the sub-
stantive law establishing a similar federal admiralty remedy. In Madruga
v. Superior Court,"' for example, the plaintiff sought the sale of a vessel
and partition of funds according to a state statute. The defendant, an
owner of a minority interest, objected on the grounds that a partition in
admiralty was required and that admiralty requires that the parties have
equal interests. The Supreme Court found that the dispute was against a
co-owner, not the vessel; consequently the proceeding was not one in rem.
Additionally, the court noted the absence of a need for an exclusive na-
tional law to govern quarreling shipowners.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
A. Admiralty, the Common Law and the States
Professor Kent refers to the English history of conflict between admi-
ralty and the common law:
There has existed a very contested question, and of ancient standing,
touching the proper division or boundary line between the jurisdiction of
the courts of common law and the courts of admiralty. The admiralty juris-
diction in England originally extended to all crimes and offences committed
upon the sea, and in all ports, rivers, and arms, of the sea, as far as the tide
ebbed and flowed. Lord Coke's doctrine was, that the sea did not include
any navigable waters within the body of a county; and Sir Matthew Hale
supposed, that prior to the statute of 35 Edw. III., the common law and the
admiralty exercised jurisdiction concurrently in the narrow seas, and in
ports and havens within the ebb and flow of the tide. Under the statutes
of 13 R. II. c. 5. and 15 R. II. c. 3., excluding the admiralty jurisdiction
in cases arising upon land or water within the body of a county, except in
cases of murder and mayhem, there have been long and vexatious conten-
tions between the admiralty and the common law courts. On the sea shore,
the common law jurisdiction is bounded by low water mark; and between
high and low water mark, where the sea ebbs and flows, the common law
and the admiralty have a divided or alternate jurisdiction.
19 The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. 555 (1867).
20 177 U.S. 638 (1900).
2 1 Madruga v. Superior Ct., 346 U.S. 556 (1954).
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With respect to the admiralty jurisdiction over arms of the sea, and bays
and navigable rivers, where the tide ebbs and flows, there has been great
difference of opinion, and great litigation, in the progress of the English
jurisprudence. On the part of the admiralty, it has been insisted, that the
admiralty continued to possess jurisdiction in all ports, havens and navig-
able rivers, where the sea ebbs and flows below the first bridges. ... On the
part of the common law courts, it has been contended, that the bodies of
counties comprehended all navigable rivers, creeks, ports, harbours, and
arms of the sea, which are so narrow as to permit a person to discern, and
attest upon oath, any thing done on the other shore, and so as to enable an
inquisition of facts to be taken.22
The jurisdictional struggle between common law and admiralty was
carried over to the United States with the added complexity that the Con-
stitution granted admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts and left the
state courts of general jurisdiction essentially untouched as the great re-
positories of the common law. Thus every conflict between the jurisdic-
tion of admiralty, and the jurisdiction of common law becomes a conflict
between the federal and state power to determine the substantive law.
This is further complicated by the territorial overlap caused by each coastal
state making claim to its own territorial waters. 3
The first federal case to consider the question of the grant of federal
admiralty jurisdiction and its relationship to state common law jurisdiction
was Delovio v. Boit.2 4 De Lovio was a case in which the issue was the ex-
tent of admiralty jurisdiction over a contract of marine insurance. The
case was heard by Justice Story while on circuit, and in his opinion he gave
a great deal of attention to the history of the struggle between the courts
of admiralty and common law. He argued that Lord Coke was mistaken
in his attempts to confine the ancient jurisdiction of the admiralty to the
high seas, and in attempting to exclude it from the narrow tidewaters and
from ports and havens. In Story's opinion the delegation of cognizance
of "all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" to the courts of
the United States "comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries
[and] Ithe latter branch is necessarily bounded by locality; the former
extends over all contracts . . .which relate to the navigation, business
or commerce of the sea. 'a5  The specific holding that the contract was in
admiralty did not receive immediate acceptance, but the bifurcation of ad-
miralty jurisdiction into contract and tort, and the dictum that established
locality as the test of admiralty tort jurisdiction have generated a large body
of supporting precedent. After De Lovio, contracts that concerned the sub-
ject matter of commerce on the seas, without regard to the place of the
2 2 J. KENT, COMMENTA ES ON AMERICAN LAW 342-43 (1826). (footnotes omitted).
23 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970), a part of title II of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953; insures
each state a minimum seaward boundary of three geographical miles.
24 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D, Mass. 1815).
25Id. at 444.
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making of the contract, and all torts which were consummated on the seas
within the ebb and the flow of the tide were within the jurisdiction of ad-
miralty.
Story's conclusion in De Lovio had the effect of excluding the legisla-
tive jurisdiction of the coastal states' governments from the seaward strip
of tide water which they had reserved to themselves as territorial waters.26
It also subordinated the substantive law of the states to the general law of
admiralty within this band of water, except where there is jurisdiction
based on the saving clause.
B. The Locality Test
The De Lovio opinion was followed by Thomas v. Lane,27 another opin-
ion by Justice Story. In Thomas, a seaman brought an action against the
master and mate of the ship on which he was a crew member, charging
assault and battery, and imprisonment in the port of Havana. Story raised
the issue of whether the confinement had occurred on land, for it was his
understanding that the extent of the court's power over torts depended
upon the locality of the act; in other words, whether the tort was "com-
mitted on the high seas, or on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide."
28
There is no further elaboration of this line of demarcation between things
occurring "on the high seas, or on the waters" and those on land, but the
Thomas opinion does indicate that the admiralty courts of the United
States would have no jurisdiction over a tort occurring wholly on shore at
a foreign port.
Whether Justice Story intended to establish the constitutional limits of
admiralty tort jurisdiction, such that the water's edge would be a dividing
point, is open to debate. It is probable that Story's primary concern was
not to find the limits of admiralty jurisdiction, but to conclusively establish
that such jurisdiction extends to all tort actions arising upon waters within
ports. This interpretation is supported by his comment in Thomas that "at
least as to torts upon tide waters in foreign countries, the jurisdiction of
the admiralty attached, seeing that it was its ancient right, and not within
the prohibitions of the statutes of Rich. II.2 Had Story been advocating
a broader basis for tort jurisdiction, he could have used language com-
parable to that employed in De Lovio for establishing jurisdiction over
contracts. He did not, and it is evident that he viewed locality as at least
the primary test. Story's expansive purpose, however, suggested that other
26 But see Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851). In an opinion decided wholly
on the issue of whether the commerce power called for federal preemption of the power to regu-
late commerce, the Court permitted Pennsylvania to require the use of harbor pilots in the port
of Philadelphia.
2723 F. Cas. 957 (No. 13,902) (C.C.D. Me. 1813).
28 Id. at 960.
29 Id.
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courts relying on De Lovio as authority for the constitutional limits of ad-
miralty jurisdiction should have done so with caution.
Nevertheless, subsequent courts elevated the "locality" and the "wat-
er's edge" tests to seeming constitutional status. For instance in The Ply-
mouth,0 the propeller Falcon had been moored to a wharf owned by the
libelants. Through negligence on the part of the crew, the ship caught
fire, and sparks from the blaze ignited and destroyed the wharf. A libel
in rem was brought against the Plymouth, a sister ship of the Falcon, but
the trial court dismissed the action for want of admiralty jurisdiction. Be-
fore the Supreme Court, the libelants argued that general maritime law
should depend on the transaction and "therefore [extendj to all cases of
service, contract, tort, or accident, 'relating to ships, shipping and marine
commerce' " (as was the practice in Continental admiralty courts) 31 or, in
the alternative, that locality should be given a broad construction.m3 With-
out reference to the "transaction" argument and, after a brief reference to
the locality test set forth in Thomas v. Lane, the Court affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the tort claim: "[Tjhe wrong and injury complained
of must have been committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable wat-
ers, or, at least, the substance and consummation of the same must have
taken place upon these waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction."83
Justice Story's locality test thus became the touchstone for determining
admiralty jurisdiction for over a century and a half. The basic simplicity
of the test may be one reason for its longevity and, for the bulk of mari-
time tort litigations, the test has been quite satisfactory in screening the
parties and the issues."' Nevertheless, the convenience and simplicity of
the test may in themselves produce problems for the courts in certain ex-
ceptional instances.
Employing the locality test requires that the court determine the "locus
of the tort," which is often a metaphysical problem. In The Plymouth, the
Court put itself into the position of deciding whether wharf damage caused
by the ship's burning was a tort upon the ebb and the flow of the tide.
The problem is further exemplified by two classic cases, Smith & Sons v.
Taylor 5 and Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal CoY6  In Taylor, a long-
shoreman was knocked from a pier into the water, that is, from a non-
maritime locality to a maritime locality. Conversely, in Minnie, a long-
80 70 U.S. 20 (1865).
31 Id. at 26.
82 Id. at 28-31.
33 Id. at 35.
34 See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 254 (1972), and
G. GIL..MORE AND C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 24 n.88 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
GILMORE AND BLACK].
35 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
36295 U.S. 647 (1935).
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
shoreman was knocked from the ship onto the pier. Admiralty jurisdic-
tion was denied in Taylor, but upheld in Minnie. In each opinion the
Court used the locality test to justify its holding. Similarly, in Gutierrez
v. Waterman Steamship Corp the Supreme Court was faced with de-
termining whether a tort occasioned in the unloading of a ship was within
admiralty jurisdiction. The Court found that an injury to the longshore-
man caused by the improper packaging of coffee beans "while or before
the ship [wasJ unloaded," was a tort which merely took effect on shore,
but, for purposes of jurisdiction, had occurred in a maritime locality."
C. Legislative and Judicial Expansion of the Locality
Covered by Admiralty
While Story's locality concept has retained its vitality as the fundamen-
tal test of admiralty jurisdiction, his limitation of the locality to acts oc-
curring upon the "ebb and flow of the tides" has been abandoned. Eighty-
three years after The Plymouth, Congress passed the Extension of Ad-
miralty Jurisdiction Act: "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to
person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding
that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land." ' The Ex-
tension Act was intended to reverse the holding of The Plymouth by con-
clusively establishing the maritime locality of certain torts which resulted
in damage to land based facilities.
The constitutionality of the Extension Act was tested in Fematt v. City
of Los Angeles, ° a case in which a shorebased linesman suffered personal
injuries occasioned by a break of the forward spring line of the ship which
he was servicing. The Court noted that the Senate Report on the Exten-
sion Act read:
Adoption of the bill will not create new causes of action. It merely spe-
cifically directs the court to exercise the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion of the United States already conferred by article III, section 2 of the
.Constitution and already authorized by the Judiciary Act.41
The Court disagreed, on the basis of The Plymouth, that jurisdiction over
ship-to-shore torts had previously been authorized by the Judiciary Act,
finding such a view to be "inconsistent with every case which had thereto-
fore dealt with ship-to-shore torts. The Admiralty Extension Act must
surely be interpreted to broaden the scope of the Judiciary Acts with re-
87 373 U.S. 2o6 (1963).
3sid. at 210.
89 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
40 196 F. Supp. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
411d. at 91.
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spect to these torts as much as the constitutional grant will permit."2
Critical analysis of the wording in De Lovio may support this view of The
Plymouth. In stating his locality limitation, Justice Story referred to the
"delegation of cognizance of 'all civil cases of admiralty.'"4 This lan-
guage should be compared with the 1789 Judiciary Act which grants "cog-
nizance of all civil cases of admiralty" 4 and the Constitutional extension of
the judicial power "to all cases of admiralty." 45 Story's word choice sug-
gests that he was interpreting only the Judiciary Act. This is further re-
flected in his statements in a portion of the opinion immediately preceding
the above quotation:
[T]here is no solid reason for construing the terms of the constitution
in narrow or limited sense .... [Njational policy, as well as juridical
logic, require the clause of the constitution to be so construed as to em-
brace all maritime contracts, torts and injuries, or, in other words, to em-
brace all those causes, which originally and inherently belonged to the ad-
miralty, before any statutable restriction.48
Moreover, there are often instances in which Congress has prompted an
expansion of the territorial scope of admiralty jurisdiction. In 1845 Con-
gress passed an act extending the jurisdiction of the district courts to cer-
tain cases arising upon the lakes and navigable waters of the United States.
[TJhe district courts of the United States shall have, possess, and exercise,
the same jurisdiction in matters of contract and tort, arising in, upon, or
concerning, steamboats and other vessels of twenty tons burden and up-
wards, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and at the time employed
in business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in dif-
ferent States and Territories upon the lakes and navigable waters con-
necting said lakes, as is now possessed and exercised by the said courts in
cases of the like steamboats and other vessels employed in navigation and
commerce upon the high seas, or tide waters, within the admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction of the United States.47
This jurisdictional extension was challenged as being beyond the constitu-
tional limits of admiralty jurisdiction. In The Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh,4 1 the Court noted that "[tjhe language and decision of this court,
whenever a question of admiralty jurisdiction had come before it, seemed
to imply that under the Constitution of the United States, the. jurisdiction
was confined to tide-waters. '49  But giving high respect to the opinion of
421d., but see United States v. Matson Nav. Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953). Damage
caused by vessel to dike extending from shore was within admiralty jurisdiction prior to passage
of Extension Act.
4 3 De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
44 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Star. 76-77 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970)).
45 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
4 6 De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 443 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
47 Act of February 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Star. 726-27 (now 28 U.S.C § 1873 (1970)).
48 53 U.S. 443 (1851).
49 Id. at 451.
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Congress in passing the Act, the Court rejected all prior decisions as "er-
roneous" and accepted the view that admiralty was, since 1789, "made to
depend upon the navigable character of the water, and not upon the ebb
and flow of the tide. If the water was navigable it was deemed to be pub-
lic; and if public, was regarded as within the legitimate scope of the ad-
miralty jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution."' ' 0
The effect of The Genessee Chief was to make the Act of 1845 unneces-
sary. At the prompting of Congress, the Court had expanded its inter-
pretation of the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to include all navigable
waters. In The Eagle,5 an opinion subsequent to The Genessee Chief,
the Court pointed out that the 1845 Extension Act had become inoperative,
with the exception of the clause which grants the right to a jury trial to
either party.5 2
Another act of Congress which later had the effect of extending ad-
miralty jurisdiction was the Death on the High Seas Act (DHSA)." The
DHSA was enacted in 1920 to remedy the absence of an action for wrong-
ful death in substantive admiralty law. The Act provides that the personal
representative of any person killed more than a marine league (three miles)
from the shore may maintain a suit for damages in admiralty against the
vessel or against the person liable for the injury. The Act excludes this
remedy from the seaward band of waters around the states one marine
league wide and also from state territorial waters where those waters ex-
tend more than a marine league from the shore.54
At the time of the passage of the DHSA, transoceanic flight was vir-
tually unknown. Indeed Lindbergh did not cross the Atlantic until seven
years later, and it is difficult to believe that Congress had any activity in
mind other than shipping on the high seas. In 1941, however, the Act
was found to be applicable to deaths resulting when an airplane crashed
on the high seas. In Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co.,55 a seaplane
vanished during an overseas flight. The personal representative of one of
5Old, at 457.
5175 U.S. 15, 25 (1868).
52This right to jury trial is continued in the present statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970).
53 The Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970). Section 761 reads:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or de-
fault occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or
the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the
personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district
courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife,
husband, parent, child or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation
which would have been liable if death had not ensued.
54 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1970).
The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies
for death shall not be affected by this chapter. Nor shall this chapter apply to the
Great Lakes of to any waters within the territorial limits of any State, or to any navi-
gable waters in the Panama Canal Zone.
55 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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the passengers brought a civil action in a federal district court based on
the DHSA. Finding that the purpose of the DHSA was "to give a right
to damages for wrongful death where no state surely could give it but
where only the Federal Government could claim to extend its power,"5
the court concluded that the decedent's representative had a right of action
in admiralty based on the DHSA.
The Choy decision has been the basis for extending admiralty jurisdic-
tion far beyond the DHSA. For example, in Notarian v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.,57 the libelant was injured when she was jolted about as she
left the restroom of an airplane on a transatlantic flight. Relying on cases
which apply the DHSA to deaths in plane crashes, the court held that an
airplane flying over the high seas is within the purview of admiralty be-
cause of the maritime locality. Consequently, admiralty has jurisdiction
over all torts occurring above the high seas whether resulting in death or
not.
Maritime locality, since De Lovio v. Boit, has extended over the ebb
and the flow of the tide, as well as the high seas. The logical extension of
Notarian, therefore, is that airplane torts occurring above the sea or crashes
into the seas less than a marine league from the shore are within admiralty
jurisdiction. This extension was made explicit in the decision of Wein-
stein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 8 In that case a Lockheed Electra aircraft
crashed into Boston Harbor only minutes after take off on a flight from
Boston to Philadelphia. The district court dismissed for want of jurisdic-
tion, holding that in the absence of a statute, maritime locality plus mari-
time connection was required for admiralty jurisdiction.59 The Third Cir-
cuit reversed: "[T]he weight of authority is clearly to the effect that local-
ity alone determines whether or not a tort claim is within the admiralty
jurisdiction."'60
The remarkable flexibility that admiralty tort jurisdiction has demon-
strated may lead one to ask if there really are constitutional limits to it.
The grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, like other grants of ju-
risdiction, is controlled by the enumerated powers of Congress "[tJo con-
stitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court" and "to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper."'" What is surprising is that ad-
miralty's flexibility has usually been made to fit within the concept of "lo-
cality." At the prompting of Congress, the Court in The Genesee Chief
found that the navigable waters of the Great Lakes had always been with-
in admiralty, and the Fematt Court concluded that all previous decisions
56Id. at 484.
5 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
58316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963).
59 203 F. Supp. 430,433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
60 316 F.2d 758, 763 (3d Cir. 1963).
61 U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 8.
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thought to be interpreting the Constitution were only interpreting the Ju-
dicary Act of 1789.
The latest Supreme Court decision on admiralty matters, -Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,62 has apparently sacrificed some of the
constitutional purity of decisions like The Genesee Chief, Weinstein and
Notarian in order to put admiralty jurisdiction on a new footing. Executive
Jet, though not the Erie Railroad of admiralty, promises to be a most im-
portant admiralty jurisdiction opinion.
III. THETEXECUTIVE JET DECISION
In Executive let, the Supreme Court was confronted with the question
whether locality was suitable as the only criterion of admiralty tort juris-
diction. The case arose as a libel brought by the owners of a chartered
plane which crashed into the navigable waters of Lake Erie immediately
after takeoff from Burke Lakefront Airport, an airport owned and operated
by the City of Cleveland. The airplane, on a flight plan from Cleveland,
Ohio, to Portland, Maine, and then to White Plains, New York, en-
countered a flock of seagulls immediately after lifting off the runway. The
birds were sucked into the jet engine, the plane veered, struck the airport
perimeter fence and sank into Lake Erie just off the end of the runway.
The plane's impact on the water and the subsequent sinking inflicted most
of the damages.
In the claim for relief, the libelant asserted that because the damages
were due to the craft's immersion in navigable waters, a maritime locality
was established and admiralty jurisdiction was proper. Respondents
countered that the tortious act, assuming there was one, occurred over land
when the aircraft struck the birds, thus precluding admiralty cognizance. 61
The district court, in an unreported decision, held: (1) that there was no
maritime locality involved in the tort; and (2) that a maritime nexus was
not present. 4 The district court's holding was based on the Sixth Circuit
precedent of Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 5 a case which de-
nied admiralty jurisdiction to a claim brought by a swimmer for injuries
sustained while diving from a pier into shallow water. Rather than wrestle
with a locus of the tort determination, the Supreme Court assumed mari-
time locality, turned to the maritime nexus argument and concluded:
[T]he mere fact that the alleged wrong "occurs" or "is located" on or over
navigable waters . . . is not of itself sufficient to turn an airplane negli-
gence case into a "maritime tort." It is far more consistent with the his-
tory and purpose of the admiralty to require also that the wrong bear a sig-
62 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
63 Id. at 266-67.
" Id. at 251.
65 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
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nificant relationship to traditional maritime activity. We hold that unless
such a relationship exists, claims arising from airplane accidents are not
cognizable in admiralty in the absence of legislation to the contrary.06
The holding of Executive let, construed narrowly, is that (1) for
an aviation tort to fall within the constitutional grant of admiralty juris-
diction, the wrong complained of must bear a "significant relationship"
to traditional maritime activity, and (2) land based aircraft on flights
between points within the continental United States are not engaged in an
activity which bears a significant enough relationship to bring them within
the purview of admiralty.
The impact of the decision cannot, however, be held within such nar-
row bounds. The scope of the state's jurisdictional competence is an inverse
function of the scope of federal jurisdiction. It is unquestionable that Exec-
utive let has sub silentio overruled Weinstein. The facts of Weinstein
were exactly parallel to those of the principal case, yet the Executive let
Court held: "[T]he Ohio courts could plainly exercise jurisdiction over the
suit, and could plainly apply familiar concepts of Ohio tort law without
any effect on maritime endeavors."67
Just how far Executive Jet has gone in affirming the exclusive legisla-
tive jurisdiction of the states over aviation torts requires close analysis.
The legislative jurisdiction of a sovereign state, as distinct from the com-
mon law powers of its courts, extends no farther than its territorial claim.
In the case of Ohio and other Great Lakes states, the territorial limit is the
international boundary between the United States and Canada. 8  For
coastal states, the limit is one marine league from the coast. Within this
band of state territorial waters, Executive Jet is clear in its holding that any
transaction or occurrence which does not have the required nexus to mari-
time affairs is a matter of state concern only. Thus, after Executive Jet
the territorial applicability of state wrongful death statutes dovetails with
the DHSA, which does not apply to claims arising within state waters.6 9
Under the locality-only test of De Lovio v. Boit,70 the admiralty courts
exercised preemptive substantive jurisdiction over the territorial waters of
coastal states. The requirement of a maritime nexus brings this approach to
an end and affirms the states' legislative jurisdiction to the full extent of
their respective territories.
66409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
671 d. at 273.
6843 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970).
69 The judicially created admiralty cause of action for wrongful death, set forth by the Court
in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), will still be applicable for claims
arising within state waters to the extent that admiralty jurisdiction can be established.
70 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
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But the impact of Executive Jet is still greater. Though its holding is
directly related to the states' territorial waters, its logic should have a sub-
.stantial spill-over effect upon problems arising in federal and international
waters. The holding that land-based aircraft flying between points within
-the United States do not meet the required nexus prompts the question of
'whether any aircraft has sufficient nexus with maritime matters to invoke
admiralty jurisdiction. The Court raised this question but declined to
give an answer 1 because the issue was not before it. However, the Court
did hint at the answer it would give:
One area in which locality as the exclusive test of admiralty tort juris-
diction has given rise to serious problems in applkation is that of aviation.
For the reasons discussed, we have concluded that maritime locality alone
is not sufficient predicate for admiralty jurisdiction in aviation tort cases.72
Furthermore, referring to travel by ship and by air, the Court noted that
"the differences between the two modes of transportation are far greater in
terms of their basic qualities and traditions and consequently in terms of
the conceptual expertise of the law to be applied. ' 78  Finally, the Court
observed:
The matters with which admiralty is basically concerned have no conceiv-
able bearing on the operation of aircraft, whether over land or water. In-
deed, in contexts other than tort, Congress and the courts have recognized
that, because of these differences, aircraft are not subject to maritime law.7 4
Hence if a maritime nexus is required to bring torts within admiralty ju-
risdiction, even when those torts occur outside the territorial waters of a
state, the Notarian and the Choy decisions would appear to be wrong.
That is, both the application of the DHSA to crashes of aircraft and the
extension of admiralty jurisdiction to torts in the air are questionable.
Paradoxically, three times in its opinion the Court reaffirmed the decision in
Choy, holding the DHSA applicable to airplane crashes on the high seas
beyond a marine league from the shore. Yet the Court discredited the
Notarian decision by an aside about federal courts which "have been per-
suaded in aviation cases to extend their admiralty jurisdictions beyond stat-
utory coverage of the Death on the High Seas Act.' 75
The Executive Jet Court seems to have said that it does not favor the
use of admiralty law in the field of aviation. It would prefer to keep ad-
miralty as the law of a specialized industry, but, recognizing that if federal
law were not applicable to plane crashes on the high seas, recovery would
depend upon a confusing consideration of what substantive law to apply,
71409 U.S. at 264 n.15.
721d. at 261.
'Id. at 269.
741d. at 270.
751d. at 264.
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the Court declined to overrule Choy. The Court appears to have instructed
the lower courts to restrict the use of admiralty jurisdiction, even on the
high seas, to matters having a sufficient maritime nexus, absent a clear
legislative expression to the contrary. Implicit in the Executive Jet opin-
ion is a recommendation from the Court to Congress that legislation be
enacted to overrule Choy and establish federal aviation law on an inde-
pendent footing:
If federal uniformity is the desired goal with respect to claims arising from
aviation accidents, Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to enact
legislation applicable to all such accidents, whether occurring on land or
water, and adapted to the specific characteristics of air commerce.70
IV. THE NExus STANDARD
Executive Jet did not specifically articulate how future courts should
determine whether a particular wrong bears a "significant relationship to
traditional maritime activities." Like due process, state action, and the
other abstract tests employed by the courts, the maritime nexus test defies
resolution into a simple yet comprehensive definition. The answer to this
jurisdictional question may best be achieved through a set of choice-influ-
encing considerations, properly drawn and balanced against one another.
Four factors, which should be employed in choosing to exercise admiralty
jurisdiction, are readily identifiable: (1) locality; (2) state governmental
interest; (3) national governmental interest; and (4) the integrity of ad-
miralty law.
A. Locality
The Executive Jet opinion dearly held that merely being on or over the
waters is not sufficient to bring an incident into admiralty. It could be
assumed that Executive Jet created a "locality plus" test, such that maritime
locality must be established before nexus becomes an issue; however, that
would be an unnecessarily narrow reading of the entire opinion. Cases in
which the traditional locality is absent, exemplified by O'Donnell v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.7 7 and Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,"8
indicate that locality is not a constitutional prerequisite. Locality is only
one consideration, albeit an important one, but, if all other indications
point to exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, then notwithstanding absence
of maritime locality, admiralty jurisdiction should be found.
Treating locality as a jurisdictional factor relates to its role in es-
tablishing boundaries of admiralty. Maritime locality establishes a lin&
of demarcation between the jurisdiction of the coiamon law and of admi.
7old. at 274.
77318 U.S. 36 (1943) (seaman injured on shorein the course of his duties).
78373 U.S. 206 (1963).
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ralty. This line represents a working balance of interests between the state
and federal governments.79 As a limiting device, locality serves two pur-
poses. It establishes a landward restriction on admiralty jurisdiction, as
employed by Justice Story in Thomas v. Lane,80 and sets a seaward limit on
state territorial jurisdiction at the outward boundary of the state's territorial
waters.81
The specific holding of the Court that locality is not enough, coupled
with the Court's comment that state law could be used to resolve the im-
mediate dispute, firmly establishes the jurisdiction of the states over naviga-
ble waters within their territorial boundaries and makes that jurisdiction
exclusive where the nexus test is not satisfied. Such jurisdiction is signifi-
candy different from the deference shown the common law by the saving-
to-suitors clause since state law may now be applied of its own force to
determine the rights of the parties.
B. State Governmental Interests
State interests center on the desire of the state for resolution of causes
of action according to principles of local law. Such an interest is present
when citizens of the state are involved or when the cause of action arises
within the state's territorial boundaries. The state interest exists even
though the particular dispute relates to maritime activities. While admi-
ralty can preempt the local law in an appropriate case, a critical question
arises as to how far the national law should go. The justification for admi-
ralty's displacing state law is the federal interest in the shipping industry;
however the concerns of the industry reach a multitude of activities in
which the national interest may be quite remote."' Whe4 the state inter-
est begins to outweigh the national, it becomes increasingly difficult to jus-
tify application of federal law. Typical of this problem is Victory Carriers,
Inc. v. Law, 5 in which the Court refused to extend admiralty jurisdiction
to a claim for relief brought by a longshoreman injured on the dock by the
stevedore's equipment. The Court noted that such injuries were tradition-
ally governed by state law, and, even though the libelant had been involved
in handling goods for eventual loading aboard a ship, his relationship to
maritime activities was too "attentuated" to exercise admiralty jurisdiction.'
C. National Governmental Interest
The national interest to be considered has two aspects. First, the fed-
79 See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971).
80 23 F. Cas. 957 (No. 13,902) (C.C.D. Me. 1813).
8 1 While some coastal states may claim offshore jurisdiction beyond three miles, this fact is
recognized by the DHSA and probably is consistent with the rationale of Executive Jet.
8 2 See GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 34, at 26-27.
83 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
'8Id. at 213.
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eral admiralty system was created to foster the maritime industry and to
promote commerce between the states and between this country and foreign
nations. These goals were to be served through a uniform body of both
substantive and procedural law designed to meet the needs of shipping and
related activities. The desired uniformity was intended to preclude local
discriminatory practices and to provide a national system of law upon
which foreign traders could rely. 5 Thus the federal interest in the busi-
ness of the sea extends to all navigable waters within the United States as
well as the high seas.
The second interest of the national government concerns the resolution
of disputes arising beyond state territorial boundaries, that is, within "fed-
eral" waters. Just as the state is desirous of assuring relief for wrongs oc-
'curing within its territory, the federal government has an interest in cor-
recting wrongs arising on the high seas. A countervailing state interest
develops, however, when a state's citizens are involved in torts occurring
beyond the state territorial boundaries. Discussion of the state's interest in
these actions is not academic; common law personal causes of action are
transitory, and thus a state court theoretically could serve as a forum for
hearing such disputes on the basis of common law. However, once be-
yond state territorial waters, the state's interests generally will be dimin-
ished to the point that even a slight showing of national interest will be
sufficient to justify the exercise of federal admiralty jurisdiction.
Applying the same balancing procedure developed above to resolve
conflicting state and federal interests in disputes arising within state ter-
ritorial waters, it may be constitutionally proper for the federal govern-
ment to refrain from exercising-jurisdiction when the federal interest is
minimal. When, however, specific federal legislation is found, courts ought
to accept this as evidencing a permissible congressionial desire to federalize
the particular class of cases. This judicial attitude was exemplified by the
Executive let Court's willingness to allow aviation torts in admiralty un-
der the DHSA, despite the fact that Congress may not have foreseen such
an application of the Act.
D. Integrity of Admiralty Law
The integrity of admiralty law concerns the development of both sub-
stantive and procedural rules to serve the maritime industry. Application
of admiralty law to a non-admiralty problem may not only produce an un-
satisfactory result in the immediate dispute, but may also cause a general
perturbation of the principles of admiralty. The Court in Executive let
8 5 See Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1916); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. 443 (1851); McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 34, at 10-11 and Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and
Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L REv. 250, 260-61 (1950).
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intimated this problem when it noted the present inability of the admi-
ralty to deal with aviation torts."6
E. Application of the Choice-Influencing Considerations
The operation of the balancing system detailed above can be demon-
strated through a few examples of unresolved conflicts between state law
and admiralty. The first example concerns water pollution and involves
two problems. The first relates to shore-based industrial plants dumping
chemical waste into navigable waters within the state. The locality con-
sideration immediately presents a problem, as it- did when it was employed
as the sole test of jurisdiction. While the water, a traditional maritime lo-
cality, is being polluted, the source is on the shore, and the tortious act
arguably occurs there. The state interest in local resolution is particularly
strong since the act is occurring within its territory and is threatening the
health and prosperity of its citizens. The presence of a federal interest in
fostering maritime services is minimal. While water serves as the medium
for carrying commercial vessels, pollutants may have no deleterious effect
unless concentrated to the point of endangering health or restricting steer-
age. Furthermore, the suitability of substantive admiralty law to handle
such a situation is highly questionable. Since the common law could pro-
vide adequate relief, admiralty jurisdiction should not be asserted.
The second problem concerns the dumping of untreated waste from
freighters into the waters of a state. Maritime locality is clear, and substan-
tive admiralty law presumably is fashioned to handle such tortious acts by
operators of vessels. While the state again has an interest in halting pol-
lution, the federal interest is substantial. The vessel is engaged in com-
merce, and there is a national interest in preventing excessive penalties
which could create an undue burden upon commerce and in establishing
standards for the processing equipment such vessels would be required to
employ to avoid future violations. Because the national interest, the sub-
stantive sufficiency of admiralty, and traditional maritime locality all mili-
tate in its favor, admiralty jurisdiction should be exercised. 7
When pleasure boats are the source of pollution, however, the balanc-
ing of considerations may produce a different result. The federal interest
has been identified with the commercial shipping industry, not with pri-
vate pleasure boating. Traditional maritime locality and sufficiency of the
admiralty law remain unchanged, but the extent of the federal govern-
ment's legitimate interest in such non-commercial activities is less. When
private boaters cause pollution within state navigable waters, the strong
state interest in local resolution, coupled with the availability of effective
86 409 U.S. 249, 270-71 (1972).
87 Bat see Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 1590
(1973).
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state remedies, suggests that admiralty jurisdiction ought not be asserted.
The need for uniformity of law is not as critical as it is for commercial
shipping. There may be some national interest in establishing standards
for onboard waste processing equipment, such that interstate travel might
not be impinged by varying, state requirements, but the federal govern-
ment should be little concerned with varying state penalties or forfeiture
laws in relation to non-commercial sea traffic. On the other hand, when
pleasure craft are guilty of pollution on the high seas, the federal interest
'in dispute resolution and the federal responsibility to other nations which
ply the world's waters may tip the balance to admiralty in the face of a
diminished state interest. A further consideration is the questionable re-
sponsiveness of state courts to their potential jurisdiction over offenses oc-
curring on the high seas.88
Similar considerations should carry over into other aspects of pleasure
boating. Since admiralty has traditionally related to commercial activities,
it has only a remote interest in these private pursuits. On non-navigable
waters (those waters which do not support commercial transport of
goods), the state courts have exclusively decided the rights and duties of
those involved in pleasure boating. When the tortious act occurs on navi-
gable waters within the state, there seems little reason for admirality to
perfunctorily assume jurisdiction over disputes arising from the operation
of pleasure boats."' However, there is a most significant consideration that
both private and commercial vessels operate upon the same medium; hence
a uniform set of rules of the road is virtually required. to regulate opera-
tions. To this extent federal rules should be controlling. Also, when a
pleasure boat becomes directly involved with a commercial vessel, typically
through a collision, the federal interest would encompass both vessels, and
admiralty jurisdiction should be exercised. Finally, for torts upon the high
seas the diminished state interest, balanced against the federal interest in
resolution of disputes and the positive value of having a federal forum
available for the resolution of controversies, indicates that such an act
should be within the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction."
V. CONCLUSION
After Executive let the balancing of considerations to be performed
under the maritime nexus test promises the most meaningful and realistic
determinations of admiralty jurisdiction. Correct application of the rele-
8 8 1For further consideration of the pollution problem see Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc., - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 1590 (1973); Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498 (1972); Swan, Challenges to Federalism: State Legislation Concerning Marine
Oil Pollution, 2 ECOL. L. REV. 437 (1972).
89 Cf. Adams v. Montana Power Co., 354 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Mont. 1973).
9 0 For further consideration of the pleasure boating problem see Stolz, Pleasure Boating and
Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALm. L. REv. 661 (1963).
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vant factors will allow the courts of admiralty to take jurisdiction over all
tort claims in which the federal government can legitimately assert an in-
terest. In consonance with this potential broadening of the scope of ad-
miralty is a denial of jurisdiction when no significant hational interest is
present. The legislatures and the common law courts of the. states will
thus be permitted to exercise-their jurisdiction to a fuller extent.
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